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Informal, under-the-table, payments to public health providers are increasingly being 
seen as a critically important source of health financing in developing and transition 
countries.  With minimal funding levels and limited accountability publicly financed and 
delivered care falls prey to illegal payments, which require payments that can exceed 100 
percent of median income.  Methods to address the abuse include establishing official 
fees combined with improved oversight and accountability for public health providers, 
and a role for communities in holding providers accountable 
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Financing of health care in developing and transition countries takes many forms.  
Ironically it is the poorest countries that have the highest out of pocket expenditures as a 
percent of income.
1
 Government commitment to finance health care falls short in the 
lowest income countries for a number of reasons, the most obvious being modest tax 
revenues that limit spending on public health services leading to a gap between ideal 
investments and what can be afforded.  A frequently overlooked factor is the low quality 
of public services and the related poor motivation of public servants
2
 that undermines 
public investments and compromises the value of the investments.  Despite uneven 
spending by the public sector private spending is universal.  A less apparent but 
important source of that private spending is under-the-table, or informal, payments by 
patients to public sector providers.  Such payments make up a significant amount of 
spending in some countries and in most cases are illegal because all citizens are meant to 
receive free health care. 
 
This paper provides an overview of the issue, the evidence on its frequency and cost to 
patients and a set of policy proposals for addressing informal payments and the 
underlying causes of their persistence. 
 
Informal payments can be defined as “payments to individual and institutional providers, 
in kind or in cash, that are made outside official payment channels or are purchases meant 
to be covered by the health care system.  This encompasses „envelope‟ payments to 
physicians and „contributions‟ to hospitals as well as the value of medical supplies 
purchased by patients and drugs obtained from private pharmacies but intended to be part 
of government-financed health care services.”
3
  Because informal payments are so often 
paid directly to individual providers they also fall into the category of using “public 




Informal payments allow patients to jump the queue, receive better or more care, obtain 
drugs, or just simply receive any care at all.  They allow those who can pay both access to 
health care and often higher quality care.  But in addition to the undermining of equity, 
purportedly the rationale for subsidized health care, informal payments constitute 
institutionalized bribery, which taints the system as a whole. To some extent gratuity 
payments from appreciative patients are exceptions, but even in those cases there is 
evidence that such payments can serve as insurance against a future need for care, 
particularly from individual physicians. 
 
While informal payments may be a form of corruption they are often symptomatic of bad 
management, a response to under-funding, a reflection of the absence of accountability or 
some combination of these.  Whatever the source what emerges from the evidence is, 
surprisingly, how widespread informal payments are. 
 
Like most informal activities informal payments go largely unreported.  Information on 
the level and nature of informal payments can only be obtained from one or more of the 
following: observation, reports of other health providers, focus groups or, more 
commonly, reports from household surveys.   
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The data reported here are taken from multiple sources: (1) household surveys with a 
heavy reliance on the World Bank‟s Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) but 
including other representative household surveys at local, province or national levels; (2) 
the World Bank sponsored corruption surveys that use a representative sample of 
officials, businessmen and citizens; (3) health facility exit surveys; (4) corruption studies 
by Transparency International; and (5) other representative surveys of irregular practices 
conducted in specific countries.  Recall periods, an important source of potential bias in 
the data, vary depending on the survey with the most general being the corruption 
surveys that typically ask about experience in contact with the health care system over the 
past year.  Others generally followed more standard periods of one to six months. Survey 
sources are provided in Appendix 1, where relevant data sources are not footnoted.
5
   
 
A major challenge is differentiating among informal, payment official co-payment, bribes 
and gifts to providers as expressions of gratitude. Where all fees have been banned any 
payment by households is clearly unofficial, but in many countries formal fees exist 
alongside informal payments, blurring the dichotomy.  It then becomes the level, the 
recipient and the timing of patient payment that become relevant in distinguishing the 
nature of the payment and its definition as gratituity or bribe.   
 
Ex post financial transactions are particularly problematic in assessing informality of 
payment because post-service gratitude gestures are common and often expected.  Where 
providers insist on direct pre-payment or receive direct payments for specific tasks (e.g., 
such as orderlies who require payment to move patients from room to room) or payments 
are not made to an official cash window, informality of payment is likely.  For example, 
in Kyrgyz Republic in 2001 95 percent of those who paid for services did not receive a 
receipt while only 3 percent reported giving a gift to the health personnel at the time of 
service.
6
  A Bolivia study showed that perception of corruption was associated with the 




Exhibit 1 summarizes the frequency of informal payments to public health care workers 
among users of health services.  The frequency range is enormous from 3 percent in Peru 
to 96 percent in Pakistan.  Regionally South Asia stands out for its heavy reliance on 
informal payments.  East Asian experience is split between Thailand and Indonesia with 
low levels and the former Communist countries, with Cambodia at 55 percent and a dated 
estimate for Vietnam at 81 percent.  The proportions for Latin America and Eastern 
Europe have a wide distribution with low levels in some countries and among the highest 
in others, making generalizations problematic. Recent evidence from smaller samples in 
Africa suggests that informal payments of various kinds are common in Uganda, 
Mozambique and Ethiopia.
8
  In all three, patients pay public providers directly for 
consultations and drugs over and above any formal charges. 
 
Data sources vary with much of the information coming from either household surveys or 
national level governance and corruption studies. Some countries, like Bolivia (2002), 
Moldova, Kazakhstan (1999) and Poland (2002) used dedicated health facility exit 
surveys.
9
 Albania (2002), Bolivia (2001) and China data emanate from province level 
surveys, and the India data are from a district in Rajastan state.   
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Exhibit 1. Proportion who make Informal Payments Among Users of 
Health Services, Selected Countries

































Where both large household surveys and smaller studies exist for the same country, the 
latter always show higher informal payments.  Kazakhstan exhibits dramatically higher 
payments in the smaller hospital 2001 survey over a household survey in 2001.  
Albania‟s estimate of the frequency of informal payments in 1996 was 22 percent, but 
jumped to 28 and 60 percent, respectively, for outpatient and inpatient care in the smaller 
2001 survey.  Whether this is due to the greater attention to the issue with smaller, 
dedicated surveys, a focus on problematic areas or other factors, it suggests that some of 
the broader surveys underestimate the extent of patient payments. 
 
Low levels of informal payments in Peru, Paraguay, Thailand and Kosovo may reflect the 
existence of and reliance on private sector alternatives that require significant out-of-
pocket payments.  Where consumers have more choice they should be better able to 
influence provider behavior.  The higher rates reported for Colombia would question that 
explanation since Colombia has a large private health system not too different from 
Peru‟s.  The differences may reflect different degrees of oversight in public clinics and 
hospitals, but that deserves additional attention.      
 
Limited evidence of informal payment in the Czech Republic appears odd given the 
patterns observed elsewhere in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA), but it is 
consistent with other findings regarding the Czech Republic as an outlier on this issue.   
Public providers with a quasi-monopoly position, as is the case in much of ECA where 
competition only exists across public providers, are in a stronger position to charge 
patients for their services.  Rural areas or urban populations with limited access to 
alternative public or private services are particularly vulnerable to such practices as they 
are truly monopolistic providers.  
 
Exhibit 2 shows differences in outpatient and inpatient payments. With the exception of 
Bulgaria, inpatient care is more likely to be financed via informal payments, and often the 
disparity between the two types of services is dramatic, as is the case with Bangladesh, 
Tajikistan, Armenia and Albania.  Evidence for four representative Eastern European 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) reveals that formal payments 
are associated with primary and outpatient specialist care and informal payments with 
surgery and inpatient services.
10
  Households either feel the need to pay for 
hospitalizations or providers don‟t give them a choice, insisting on payment if services 
are to be rendered.   
 
The perception surveys of providers or citizens while not statistically representative offer 
additional insights that quantitative surveys cannot capture.  In Costa Rica 85 percent of 
medical staff indicated that under-the-table payments to physicians were common, and 
half of patients said they made payments in public facilities roughly equivalent to 50 
percent of the cost ofr a private sector consultation.  In Bolivia the incidence of informal 
payments was significantly correlated with perceptions of corruption in specific public 
hospitals, and 40 percent of interviewed patients acknowledged making illicit payments 
for care, this is similar to the results of a representative household survey in 106 Bolivian  
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Exhibit 2. Proportion of Patients Making Informal Payments by Type 
of Service, Selected Countries


















municipalities where 45 percent of patients reported paying informally.
11
  Interestingly, 
national surveys for Bolivia show that over 60 percent of those interviewed considered 
the health sector to be corrupt. 
 
A comparative study of citizens in five South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka) found that in all but Sri Lanka most payments were to meet ex 
ante demands from providers.  Bribes are required in all five countries for admission to 
the hospital, to obtain a bed, and to receive subsidized medications.
12
  In Bangalore, India 
citizen feedback surveys revealed that informal payments were made to ensure proper 
treatment, but they were typically demanded by providers and 51 percent of those 
interviewed indicated they had paid bribes in government hospitals and 89 percent in 
hospitals in small cities, but they also paid informally in the private hospitals (24%), 
suggesting a cultural norm of additional direct payment to providers.  More dramatically, 
bribes were paid to nurses in maternity homes so mothers could see their infants.
13
   
 
In Albania among the 60 percent of patients who received care 43 percent said the gift 
was requested.
14
  Using focus groups of patients and providers citizens explain the virtual 
market for publicly provided care in Poland.
15
  Informal payments have become the way 
to obtain the services of specific physicians, with pricing reflecting reputation and 
demand.  It is an implicit form of insurance for possible future needs, and prices are 
commonly known.  Thus the process of negotiation and payment for health services may 
be informal but it has evolved into a very sophisticated market in Poland. 
 
The motivations of health staff and patients in relying on under the table payments are 
strong.  Physicians argue that low pay, irregular salary payments, lack of government 
attention and the need to keep services going requires drastic action, and patient 
contributions offer the only source of funds to fill the gap.
16
  Patients on the other hand 
also see low pay as an impetus to contribute, but traditions of gratitude as well as 
concerns for some future need for health care also play a role.   
 
Qualitative studies in Ethiopia with policymakers, experts and health workers revealed 
that inappropriate payments are rife in the health sector.  Patients typically must pay for 
every service and each item, from hospital admittance to having a bed changed to drugs 
and supplies.
17
  Similar reports of itemized charging emerged from qualitative work in 
Albania, Georgia and Poland where the public system has become a fee-for service 
entity.
18
  Consumer confusion about the official or unofficial nature of payments is 
common.  Patients pay but they don‟t always know why and they often do so at multiple 
locations or for different “services”.
19
    
 
Multivariate analysis sheds further light on some of the underlying motivations for 
informal payment as well as whether patient revenues are well spent.  In Kazakhstan, an 
econometric analysis of patients discharged from three hospitals in Almaty City 
concluded that informal payments made in the admission department before treatment, 
and the amount paid subsequently at both admissions and hospital wards shortened 
admission time for surgery.
20
  The study found longer lengths of stay associated with 
payments to both the admissions department and directly to individual providers on the 
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wards.  Quality as perceived by patients increased with the amount paid informally.  
These results confirm the assumption that patients pay to receive more attentive and 
“higher quality” care as they perceive it.  Longer lengths of stay do not necessarily mean 
better clinical care, but shorter waits, longer hospital stays and attentive treatment by 
medical staff tend to be valued by patients.  In Kazakhstan paying ensures that health care 
meets the demands and perceived needs of patients. 
 
Of concern is the relative cost of the services to patients, and numerous studies point out 
the impact on the poor.  Exhibit 3 summarizes the available data showing the average 
cost of an outpatient visit or hospital admission as a percent of half monthly average 
income, roughly equivalent to median income.  The level of inpatient payments far 
exceeds the amounts paid out for outpatient services and numerous studies document the 
extent of hardship some households face in meeting these costs.  Inpatient costs can 
exceed annual family income forcing the sale of assets or the accumulation of debt in 
order to afford care.
21
  Selected studies in China of “red packages” paid to providers 
report that payments average between 140-320 yuan per hospital visit  (US$16-36), with 
referral hospitals averaging 400 yuan (US$44), roughly 90 percent of half monthly 




Two studies in Albania examined patient income and the size of informal payments.  The 
analysis of a three province survey showed that rural residents were more likely to pay 
for services than were urban patients and they paid roughly the same fees as patients in 
other income brackets. So income had little effect on the probability of having to pay 
informally.
23
   Estimates from a national representative survey showed high inelastic 
demand in the face of small increases in the price of health services, indicating again that 
patients are not particularly price sensitive in Albania.
24
  As a result, informal payments 
are highly regressive. 
 
Fee exemptions offer the potential for husbanding scarce resources for those least able to 
afford health care.  Many systems have instituted such procedures to retain the benefits of 
co-payments without unduly burdening the poor.
25
  Evidence on effectiveness, however, 
suggests problems with the approach.  In Bangladesh data from interviews and 
observations in a sample of four hospitals showed that 75 percent of the time the lowest 
income group paid the least amount both officially and unofficially.  In the outlier 
institutions the poor paid more than the wealthiest group but the same as or less than 
middle income patients.  Payments are also standardized and routinized with specific 
time periods for charging during inpatient stays rather than at discharge.
26
   
In Rajasthan, India, patients regularly pay for “free” outpatient care, though the poorest 
patients pay 40 percent less than the highest income patients. It should be noted that in 
this part of India everyone is poor and poverty is relative, but on average 7.3 percent of 
total household spending goes to paying for health care.
27
  In Uganda exemptions were 
extended to the politically powerful and those overseeing the local health care program, a 
perverse version of exemption meant to ensure equal access but in this case subsidizing 
the better off.
28
  Central Asia‟s experience has not been encouraging either, with minimal 
exemptions for lower income patients.
29
  Evidence from Kazakhstan showed that for 
major illnesses the lowest income households spent more than twice their monthly  
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Exhibit 3. Average Informal Payments as Percentage of Half-monthly 
Per Capita Income, Selected Countries (Int'l $ PPP)























income for health care while the wealthiest households spent the equivalent of half their 




These studies point up the salient characteristics of informal payment, but work in this 
area is just beginning.  A better understanding of the phenomenon and how to stem its 
spread is critical to good governance and accessible health care.  The key issues have 
been outlined and we now turn to policy responses. Though the evidence base is thin, 
there are good examples of things that can be done and extrapolations from related 




Policy Responses to Informal Payments 
While the extent and size of informal payments are becoming more apparent they have 
flourished unacknowledged for a long time.  Even where some action has been taken the 
responses have differed and few have been evaluated to determine the relative 
effectiveness of different interventions.  
 
Health care in most of the developing and transition countries suffers from poor 
governance and the absence of accountability in public service delivery.  Informal 
payments are an outgrowth of this breakdown as they are accompanied by irregular 
fiduciary oversight, lack of management, limited oversight of performance, and few if 
any penalties for illegal or improper behavior.  Informal payments ensure that providers 
are paid for services delivered and that some services actually reach patients, but only for 
those who can pay, undermining equity principles of publicly financed health care. The 
absenteeism of public health providers observed in much of the world is rare in transition 
economies where informal payments have become the major source of health care 
financing and providers cannot afford to be absent.
31
  However, the two often exist in 
parallel in other parts of the world. 
 
Addressing informal payments is complex and simply addressing specific abuses is 
insufficient as the issues are often more systemic in nature.  In many contexts the 
environment more generally needs to be considered.  The informal payments issue is 
addressed first here, followed by discussion of some of the more generic reforms that 
offer solutions to the underlying problems that give rise to informal payments. 
 
Controlling Informal Payments.  Strategies to control informal payments are few.  
Raising official fees as a substitute for under-the-table payments showed positive effects 
on patient payment and utilization in pilot programs in Kyrgyz Republic and Cambodia.  
Both programs made the financial arrangements more equitable, shifted the issue from 
one of corruption to equity management and, probably most importantly, it ensured that 
health provider earnings would remain the same. 
 
In Kyrgyz Republic an experiment in two regions introduced formal fees and resulted in a 
sharp reduction in informal charges. Both multivariate analysis and administrative data 
showed the proportion of patients making direct payments to providers declining from 60 
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percent to 38 percent in the experimental regions while informal payments for the rest of 
the country rose to 70 percent.  In-kind spending by patients for food and linens in the 
pilot regions with formal fees declined by over 50 percent though there was no change in 
similar spending in the rest of the country.  Formal fees combined with modest insurance 
payments helped to make health care more affordable and quelled under-the-table 
payments.
32
    
 
In a major referral hospital in Cambodia reorganization of hospital staffing combined 
with a transparent official fee policy, clearly designated exemptions, and retained fee 
revenue that supplemented physician salaries at levels comparable to those earned under 
the informal arrangements led to more reliable pricing, stable revenue and higher 
demand.  Focus groups identified informal payments as a deterrent to health service use, 
and the subsequent predictability and equity adjustments improved access without 
compromising utilization or hospital revenue, the latter a critical component of 
compensation given salary levels.
33
 Two instances do not allow sweeping conclusions nor 
was either initiative undertaken in isolation, but the fact that substituting legal for illegal 
payments and allowing the points of service to retain revenues proved effective and 
suggests that it is a strategy worth pursuing further 
 
Addressing some of the incentives underlying informal payments provides other options 
for reform.  Some alternative policies include: better incentives for health providers, 
enhancing accountability for performance, and providing community oversight. 
 
Adequate incentives for health professionals.  Providing appropriate incentives for 
health providers lie more in addressing the structure of the health care system and its 
financing rather than in limited actions that fix specific problems.  Adjustments to pay 
and benefits, clear criteria for hiring and promotion, defined discipline for misconduct 
and adequate training to equip workers with needed skills foster a functioning health 
system.  How providers are paid has dramatic effects on performance, as evidence from 
the OECD countries attests.  Payment methods are the cornerstone of incentives for 
productivity and performance and increasingly developed countries have sought 
alternatives or at least complementary means to reward performance and productivity.   
 
In most developing countries physician compensation remains salary based.  A review of 
the limited literature on the effect of salary earnings on physician clinical behavior across 
the OECD concluded that physicians whose earnings are based on salary rather than fee-
for-service, bonus payments or capitation showed lower productivity, lower levels of care 
and higher wound rates from surgery. However, salaried doctors facilitated cost control, a 
major concern in OECD health systems.
34
   
 
Low wages represent one area of potential temptation for corruption.  Where earnings are 
low individuals have second and third jobs, but they also perceive that low wages entitle 
them to demand contributions from patients.  Civil service reform is often required to 
address egregious structural problems related to postings, promotion and pay, but the 
health sector could serve as a pilot to launch improvements that stimulate better 
performance.  Evidence from a number of countries, however, suggests that higher pay 
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will not necessarily address corruption by itself, but paying wages that are appropriate to 
existing labor market conditions, prohibiting informal side payments and holding 
providers accountable could together encourage more transparent and fair transactions, 
and offer incentives for better provider performance.  Although it is expensive for 
countries to raise wages in public health care services, a reform that regularizes and 
improves pay has the potential to raise productivity.  Higher productivity, in turn, would 
make it possible to provide at least the same level of services, with fewer workers, 
thereby offsetting some of the expected increase in the total wage bill. In addition, greater 
transparency in all fiduciary functions would improve fairness and bolster effectiveness.  




Enhanced Accountability.  Improving accountability of public workers plays a key role 
in improving governance and relinquishing reliance on informal payments.  How that is 
accomplished is far from straightforward, and evidence on how to accomplish improved 
accountability remains limited.   For example, in Bolivia corruption and informal 
payments were lower where management was stronger and some form of oversight of 
staff existed, in this case, frequent written evaluations of performance, a key input for 
rewarding and disciplining staff.
36
   While a basic management tool, such assessments 
can have an impact on performance and corruption and are often absent in the worst 
performing health care systems. 
 
A recent rigorous experiment in Tanzania assessed the importance of training and 
incentives in determining physician performance across a sample of public and private 
providers.
37
  The study concludes that while ability is important, institutional incentives, 
particularly the ability to hire and fire staff, are far more powerful than education or 
experience in explaining the quality of care provided patients, offering an empirical basis 
for the priority of putting in place incentives to foster improvements in health care.  This 
obviously poses serious problems for many public programs that rely on public servants 
to delivery health care, but it makes clear the need to hold providers accountable if abuse 
is to be curtailed. 
 
Community Oversight.  The nature of accountability and how to structure incentives is 
not apparent from available evidence.  In rural or isolated areas community oversight 
offers an option, though there are few good examples of countries with effective 
oversight and accountability.  Evidence for Bolivia, Madagascar, the Philippines and 
Uganda suggests that centralized hiring, promotion and deployment of public health 
workers effectively neutralizes the role of local supervision.  If the consequences of 
absenteeism, taking of bribes and stealing of drugs are beyond the authority of local 
boards or community oversight bodies then those institutions may bring the community 
together but they will have no influence over centrally managed health staffs, or their 
service delivery responsiveness and productivity.   
 
Even where local oversight arrangements exist to promote accountability it does not 
necessarily mean that they are effective.  In Jigawa state in Nigeria hospital management 
committees meant to oversee and advise hospital managers rarely met, were unclear on 




  In Madagascar, the fact that local committees were powerless beyond 
moral suasion led providers to ignore their hollow authority and instead respond to 
supervisors who had a say in their destiny.
39
  To be effective community leaders need 
authority, and at the same time they need to be accountable to the local citizenry or to a 
higher level of government.. 
 
Local control where it goes beyond simply oversight holds promise.  Under the “Bamako 
Initiative” that gave communities in selected African countries control over health 
facilities in exchange for sharing the financing burden showed impressive health status 
improvements in at least three countries.
40
  In Ceara, Brazil the state instituted a health 
worker outreach program with contracted workers supervised by the municipalities they 
served.  Local control led to better health in the communities covered by the new state 
program.
41
  In Bolivia corruption was lower where local organizing groups were active.
42
  
In contrast local control proved ineffective in Nigeria, Madagascar and Uganda leaving 






Informal payments are much more widespread than commonly thought.  Donors and 
governments have urged banning user charges in the interests of equity in access to health 
services.  Sweeping removal of a reliable source of revenue from legitimate fees for 
equity reasons means that both the poor and the well off are subsidized.  The more 
serious issue is that under-the-table payments replace legal charges.   The one strategy 
that holds promise is the introduction of formal fees that allows payment to be above-the-
table, but this reflects only preliminary evidence.  More fundamental is a shift toward 
better governance in health care delivery with clear lines of accountability.   
 
While there is some suggestion from Kyrgyz Republic and Cambodia that instituting 
formal fees can serve to curtail informal payments, the impact of removing fees has not 
been broadly assessed.  Existing evidence suggests that addressing informal payments 
alone may not be effective.   Given the worldwide prevalence of informal payments and 
their strong negative effects on both equity and good governance policymakers need to 
focus on the issue and the means to discourage such practices.  Private health care and 
private pay go hand-in-hand, but a private system is inappropriate within the confines of 
public health care.  Not taking heed risks sending signals that irregular financial 
transactions are acceptable, which compromises the overall public health system if not 
the government more generally.   
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Appendix I: Data Sources 
Country  Data Year Source 
Albania  2002 USAID Regional Corruption Monitoring Report 
Albania 2002 World Bank LSMS 
Armenia 2001 World Bank LSMS 
Bangladesh 2002 Transparency International, 2002 
Bolivia 2001 World Bank Municipal Survey of Corruption 
Bosnia 2000 Corruption Diagnostic Survey 
Bosnia 2002 USAID Regional Corruption Monitoring Report 
Bulgaria 2001 World Bank LSMS 
Bulgaria 2002 USAID Regional Corruption Monitoring Report 
Cambodia 1999 World Bank Governance and Corruption 
China n.d. Bloom, Han and Li, 2001 
Colombia n.d. National Corruption Survey 
Croatia 2002 USAID Regional Corruption Monitoring Report 
Czech Republic 2002 Horthava, 2002 
Georgia 2000 World Bank LSMS 
Ghana 1998 World Bank LSMS 
Ghana 2000 Ghana/World Bank Governance and Corruption Survey 
Hungary 2002 Gaal, 2002 
India 2002 Transparency International, 2002 
Indonesia 2001 Indonesia Partnership for Governance Reform/World Bank 
Corruption Diagnosis Survey 
Kazakhstan 2001 World Bank Institutional and Governance Review 
Kosovo 2000 World Bank LSMS 
Kyrgyz 2001 World Bank LSMS 
Kyrgyz 2001 World Bank LSMS 
Latvia 1998 World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey 
Macedonia 2002 USAID Regional Corruption Monitoring Report 
Madagascar 2001 Transparency International Report 
Moldova 2000 Transparency International Report, 2001 
Moldova 2002 WHO/IDB/Transparency International Report 
Morocco 2001 Transparency International  
Nepal 2002 Transparency International  
Pakistan 2002 Transparency International  
Paraguay 1999 World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey 
Peru 2001 World Bank Qualitative Survey 
Poland 1998 Chawla, Berman & Kawiorska, 2001, Survey 
Romania 2000 World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey 
Romania 2002 FBS 
Russia 2002 Russian Household Survey  
Senegal 2001 Transparency International Report 
Serbia 2002 USAID Regional Corruption Monitoring Report 
Slovakia 2000 World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey 
Sri Lanka 2001 Transparency International Report 
Tajikistan 1999 World Bank LSMS 
Tajikistan 2001 Transparency International Report 
Thailand 1999 Thailand/World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey 
Vietnam 1998 World Bank LSMS 
Uzbekistan 2001 FBS 
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